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Abstract
Mass public shootings are typically followed by a spike in gun sales as well as calls for stric-
ter gun control laws. What remains unclear is whether the spike in gun sales is motivated by
increased threat perceptions or by concerns about gun control, or whether the sales are
mainly driven by non-owners purchasing guns or gun owners adding to their collection.
Two surveys of gun owners and non-owners, conducted immediately before and after the
Orlando shooting, allowed us to assess its impact on threat perceptions and on gun-pur-
chasing intentions. Although there was a minor impact on threat perceptions of non-owners,
neither group reported any increased gun-purchasing intentions or an increased need of a
gun for protection and self-defense. We suggest that these responses are representative for
the majority of Americans and, therefore, people who are influenced by mass shootings to
buy guns are probably an atypical minority.
Introduction
There are two predictable and recurring reactions to any mass shooting: There is a call by poli-
ticians of the Democratic Party (and also of relatives of victims) for stricter gun control laws;
this reflects a belief that tighter controls can help to prevent mass shootings [1]. Yet, at the
same time, there is a spike in requests for FBI background checks; this suggests that others
instead decide to buy guns, perhaps due to a belief that being well-armed can deter such crimes
[2, 3]. It remains unclear whether these increased sales are motivated by increased threat per-
ceptions or gun control concerns and whether they are due to non-owners purchasing guns or
gun owners adding to their collection. To address these questions, we use data from two sur-
veys of gun owners and non-owners, conducted immediately before and after the 2016
Orlando mass shooting.
What is a mass shooting?
Before we address our research questions we must clarify our definition of a mass shooting
because the association between a spike in gun sales and calls for stricter gun control was
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identified by journalists—who define mass shootings based on different criteria than research-
ers. We will thus review the different definitions of mass shootings that are used by journalists
and researchers, because the choice of definition apparently varies by the purpose one pursues
in studying mass shootings. Given that newspapers are mainly interested in the newsworthi-
ness of a story, the number of people that are killed or wounded in an incident is probably the
most important criterion. However, definitions of mass shootings may vary by the types of
victims. If a researcher is interested in the motivation that drives people to commit such hor-
rendous acts, then it makes little sense to lump together shooting incidents that have vastly dif-
ferent etiologies—targeted shootings such as familicides and felony-related shootings may
involve different motivations than mass public shootings wherein an active shooter randomly
kills strangers in some public space.
It is also unclear at what point the broader public recognizes an incident as a mass shooting.
If you have ever wondered why different newspapers report wildly different numbers of mass
shootings for a given year, the reason is that there is no generally accepted definition of mass
shooting and that different databases disagree on nearly every aspect of such a definition [4].
The first point of disagreement is whether to count the number of people shot or the number
of people killed. The Gun Violence Archive [5], a data base preferred by the New York Times
and the Washington Post, uses the number of people shot rather than killed in an incident of
violence as criterion for mass shooting. This definition is the most liberal. It is purely numeri-
cal and reflects all shootings which reach that statistical threshold of four individuals wounded
or shot.
All other data bases define mass shootings in terms of the number of people killed, based on
a definition of “mass murder” introduced by the FBI in 2005. The FBI defined “mass murder”
as a multiple homicide in which four or more victims are murdered, within one event, and in
one or more locations in close geographical proximity [6]. To complicate matters, in January
14, 2013 the U.S. Congress passed a note to the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act
of 2012. 6 USC 101 that lowered the numerical criterion for mass murder to “3 or more killings
in a single incident” [7]. And yet, even though the FBI adapted their definition of mass murder
to mean three or more killing in a single incident” [8], the change in the FBI’s numerical crite-
rion did not influence the definition of mass shootings used by Congress in a report of the
Congressional Research Service about “Mass Murder with Firearms: Victims and Conse-
quences 1999–2013” published in 2015 [9]. This report defined mass shootings as multiple
homicides in “which at least four victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in
one or more locations in close proximity”. The change in the numerical criterion did, however,
influence another important source, namely the data base of mass shootings compiled by the
news organization “Mother Jones”. From January 2013 onwards, Mother Jones lowered their
inclusion criterion for mass shootings to three victims having been killed [10].
The Congressional Report also introduced an important distinction between mass shoot-
ings and mass public shootings, which became another point of disagreement [9]. The differ-
ence between mass shootings and mass public shootings is that mass public shootings exclude
mass shootings where a family member kills at least four members of their family, and felony-
related mass murders where the shooting of four people is related to some criminal activity.
Mass public shootings are considerably less frequent than mass shootings, but claim more vic-
tims killed or wounded.
This exclusion of felony-related mass shootings and familicides can be justified in terms of
motive and/or location [11]. Whereas an active shooter selects individual victims at random
(sometimes from a category of people, e.g., Blacks, Jews, Muslims) in some public place, this is
typically not the case in familicides or family-related killings. Familicides are usually the result
of a domestic dispute and occur in private homes. Felony-related mass shootings may be gang-
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related or part of a robbery and are therefore also motivationally different from mass shoot-
ings. Whereas the Gun Violence Archive [5] does not exclude any type of gun violence such as
gang shootings or domestic violence, the data base of Mother Jones excludes these types of
mass killings [10]. However, in contrast to the Congressional Report [9], Mother Jones uses
the lower numerical criterion from 2013 onwards.
These exclusion criteria also determine whether there is an increase in mass shootings over
time. Whereas the frequency of mass shootings (i.e., including familicides and felony-related
shootings) appears to have stayed relatively stable over time [12], there was a slow increase in
mass public shootings between 1970 and 2013 [9]. According to the Congressional Report [6],
there was one incident per year during the 1970s (with an average of 5.5 victims murdered and
2 wounded), but 4.5 incidents per year between 2010 and 2013 (7.4 victims killed and 6.3 vic-
tims injured per incident. Cohen, Azrael and Miller [11] even identified an acceleration in the
rate of mass public shooting between the years 2011 to 2014. In contrast, Fox and DeLatour
[12] demonstrated that there was no temporal increase in mass shootings (i.e., including famil-
icides and felony-related shootings).
Mass shootings and gun acquisition
Regardless of which definition one applies, the public mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in
Orlando, on June 12, 2016, in which 50 people died (including the gunman), and 53 were
wounded, was the deadliest mass shooting by a single shooter in U.S. history [13]. Predictably,
during that month, requests for background checks by the FBI’s National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) reached an all-time monthly high [2]. Given that there is
no federal registration system of gun sales, requests for NICS background checks are the best
proxy. However, as background checks are also required for applications for a concealed carry
license, the number of such requests might overestimate the number of actual gun sales. On
the other hand, because private sales of guns—as well as many sales made at gun shows—do
not require background checks, the monthly number of such background check requests
could also underestimate the gun sales volume. And also, predictably, a week after the Orlando
shooting—on June 18—President Obama had repeated his call for stricter gun control laws:
“Being tough on terrorism, particularly the sorts of homegrown terrorism that we've seen now in
Orlando and San Bernardino, means making it harder for people who want to kill Americans to
get their hands on assault weapons that are capable of killing dozens of innocents as quickly as
possible” [1].
As mentioned earlier, there are two potential reasons for the association of mass shootings
with the increase in gun sales: It is possible that mass shootings increase people’s fear of crime
and motivates them to buy a gun for self-protection; alternatively, the fact that politicians
respond to mass shootings with a demand for stricter gun controls could increase people’s fear
that the government will impose stricter gun control measures. These hypotheses will be dis-
cussed in the following sections.
The fear of crime interpretation
The fear of crime interpretation consists of two assumptions: first, that people’s fear of crime
motivates them to buy a gun for protection; and second, that mass shootings increase people’s
fear of crime. The first assumption is consistent with the finding that 60 percent of gun owners
cite protection and self-defense as main reason for owning a gun [3,14]. Yet surprisingly, the
evidence for the fear of crime interpretation has not been all that consistent. In a review of that
literature, Kleck et al., [15] note that “Studies assessing the effect of fear/risk and criminal victim-
ization on gun ownership have obtained wildly varying results” (p. 313). They criticize previous
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research for methodological weaknesses, such as failure to find out whether a respondent is
actually the owner of a gun (rather than being a household member) and whether the gun is
actually a handgun (rather than some other type of gun). For example, William and McGrath
[16], who measured gun ownership with the question whether respondents had any guns or
revolvers in their home and fear of crime with the question whether respondents experienced
fear when walking around their neighborhood at night, reported a negative association
between the two variables. People who experienced greater fear were less likely to own a gun.
One possible explanation is that gun ownership alleviates people’s fear. However, with the
same measures of fear and gun ownership, McClain [17] found a weak positive association for
white, but not black respondents. Hill, Howell and Driver [18], who operationalized protective
gun ownership as “handgun owners, who do not hunt”, found that fear only related to protec-
tive gun ownership in men and not women. As Marciniak and Loftus [19] pointed out, their
operationalization of protective gun ownership is problematic, because it assumes that hunting
is inconsistent with owning a handgun for protection. It is thus difficult to draw any clear
interpretations from this type of research with regards to how fear of crime correlates with gun
ownership.
Findings of studies that directly measured personal gun ownership for protection also offer
mixed support for the fear of crime hypothesis. For example, Cao et al. [20], who directly mea-
sured gun ownership for protection, found it positively associated with the (perceived) relative
crime level in the person’s community, but unrelated to perceived risk of victimization or fear
of victimization or fear of crime. One would have expected that fear of victimization or fear of
crime would have mediated the need for self-protection. Again, it is possible that gun owner-
ship made people feel less fearful. However, this explanation cannot account for the inconsis-
tencies in findings reported by Lizotte and Bordua [21]: In their study, the only determinant of
protective gun ownership was the respondents’ objective level of violent crime in their county;
furthermore, although their respondents’ fear of crime was determined by experienced victim-
ization and perceived high crime level in their community, they coped with this fear by install-
ing home defense measures such as special locks or a burglar alarm rather than acquiring a
gun.
Stronger support for the fear of crime hypothesis comes from studies by Kleck et al. [15]
and Stroebe et al. [22]. Kleck et al reported a significant positive association between personal
ownership of a handgun for protection and self-defense and perceived risk of crime. Similarly,
in a recent survey of the motivational bases of American gun ownership, Stroebe et al. [22]
found that gun ownership was predicted by the perceived likelihood of lifetime assault victimi-
zation (PLRA). Gun owners reported greater PLRA than non-owners [22]. PLRA was posi-
tively associated with the need for self-defense as a main reason for gun ownershp.
The Stroebe et al. study may also have uncovered one of the reasons for inconsistencies in
previous studies of the association of protective gun ownership with fear of crime. They found
that both gun ownership and owning a gun for self-defense were additionally influenced by a
diffuse and generalized threat emanating from the belief that the world is a dangerous and
unpredictable place, populated by mean people out to hurt others for no real reason (Belief in
a Dangerous World—BDW) [23, 24]. And whereas PLRA was influenced by a respondent’s
previous victimization experience, BDW was mainly determined by political orientation, with
politically conservative respondents scoring higher.
Whereas empirical support for the first part of the fear of crime interpretation is mixed,
the second part of the theory—that mass shootings increases people’s fear that they might
become victim of such an incident—has never been tested. The evidence from opinion polls is
indicative, but not conclusive. Although 48 percent of Americans reported a great deal or a fair
amount of worry about future terrorist attacks according to a Gallup Poll conducted in March,
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2015 [25], and although 41 percent said that they are at least somewhat worried that they or a
family member will become a victim in a CNN/ORC poll conducted immediately after the
Orlando shooting [26], we do not know the level of such worries immediately before the
Orlando shooting. Furthermore, although it would seem plausible that the immediate affective
response to a mass shooting would be to fear that this could happen to oneself or to a family
member, the chance of becoming a victim of a mass shooting is exceedingly rare. For example,
31 victims were killed in the 5 mass shootings committed in 2013 according to the Congressio-
nal Report [6]. In contrast, during the same year, 11,208 gun homicides were committed [20].
The fear of stricter gun control interpretation
Given that calls for stricter gun control laws have been a standard response by politicians to
mass shootings, it is plausible that shootings also increase Americans’ fear that stricter gun
control laws might be imposed. In 2016, the New York Times presented an extensive analysis
that illustrated that gun sales increased after each call for stricter gun controls [27]. In fact, Jan-
uary 2013 –shortly after the re-election of President Obama—saw one of the highest gun sales
on record, with two million guns sold. In contrast, whereas President Obama had been good
for firearm sales, the election of Donald Trump has been bad for the gun industry. After record
sales of guns in 2015, the election of Donald Trump resulted not only in a drop of gun sales,
but also a substantial plunge in gun company stock values [28]. One day after the election,
SturmRuger stocks fell 14% and Smith & Wesson (now American Outdoor Brands) fell by
15%. Thus, as Smith wrote in February 2017 in a piece for CNN Money “President Barack
Obama was the greatest gun salesman in America—until Hillary Clinton ran to replace him.
Sales soared to records because gun owners feared they would impose tougher gun restrictions.
Now that a Republican endorsed by the National Rifle Association is in the White House, those
supposed villains have disappeared. Sales of guns and ammo are falling, right along with the
stocks of gun makers.” [29]. Members of minorities appear to be the only exception to this
trend. The National African Gun Association has seen a recent surge in members which,
according to its president Philip Smith, appears to be driven by fear that the nation’s divisive
politics could spiral into violence. Between Election Day and the end of February, the group
has added more than 7,000 members [28].
Assessing the validity of the two interpretations
Given that both fear of crime and fear of stricter gun control appear to increase gun sales, it is
unclear whether it is fear of crime or fear of stricter gun control laws (or both) that drives gun
buying after a mass shooting. One—admittedly rather weak—way to evaluate the relative
validity of these two hypotheses is to examine whether the gun buying intentions are immedi-
ate or delayed. Given that one would expect the effect of mass shootings on fear of crime to
weaken over time, and given that calls for gun control would become stronger in the weeks fol-
lowing a mass shooting, a delayed spike is more likely to be due concerns about the imposition
of stricter gun control laws. A recent study by Wallace [30] assessed the time interval between
six mass shootings in the USA (from 2000–2010), and the spike in requests for background
checks. For two of the mass shootings, she found that effects on requests for background
checks spiked immediately (Northern Illinois University shooting, 02/14/2008; Kirkwood,
Missouri, 7-02-2008); for the other four mass shootings, effect sizes spiked four to five months
later (Wakefield, MA, 12/26/2000; Virginia Tech, 04/16/2007; Carthage, NC, 03/29/2009; Bin-
ghampton, NY, 04/03/2009.
A stronger test of the two interpretations would require information about the types of
people who buy guns following a mass shooting. Because the spikes in requests for
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background checks [2, 22] are the only available indicators of the impact of mass shootings
on gun sales, we do not know who buys guns—whether it is first-time gun buyers (i.e., non-
owners), or current gun owners who want to add to their existing arsenal. According to a
recent survey of U.S. gun owners, the average gun owner owns several guns (M = 4.06,
SD = 4.37; range: 1–30) [22]. One could imagine the possession of four firearms would be
sufficient to satisfy a need for self-defense. So maybe it is just those who had a preexisting
intention to buy—such as hobbyists who already wanted to add a precision rifle or modern
sporting rifle to their collection, who speed up their purchase for fear of stricter gun control
laws. Thus, we would predict that if the spike in gun sales is caused by gun owners purchasing
more guns, it is fear of stricter gun laws rather than fear of crime that drives their behavior.
The fear of crime explanation appears to be more applicable to people who do not own a gun
who decide―after a mass shooting—that it is time to buy one as a means of self-defense. The
assumption is that a mass shooting increases fear of crime and as a result, the need for protec-
tion and self-defense.
The Orlando mass shooting
It was by terrible coincidence that the deadliest mass public shooting in U.S. history occurred
just as we were finishing a survey of U.S. gun owners and non-owners that had originally
sought to assess the motives for gun ownership [22]. The grim circumstances offered a rare
opportunity to study the impact a mass shooting has on gun-related belief systems of gun
owners and non-owners, so we decided to repeat the survey to allow for a pre-post Orlando
analysis using a between groups design. To avoid the possibility that respondents would
remember their answer to the first survey, we collected data from a new, but comparable
sample rather than re-contacting the same individuals. Our surveys included measures of the
two threats assumed to motivate gun purchases (“Belief in a Dangerous World” and “Per-
ceived Lifetime Risk of Assault”). We also assessed respondents’ need of a gun for self-defense
and their perception of the effectiveness of a gun for self-defense. As a measure of people’s
expectations regarding the introduction of stricter gun control laws, we assessed the belief the
government wanted to take people’s guns away. Finally, we asked respondents for the amount
of money they intended to invest in gun-related products over the next six months. Note that
some of the variables we report in the present study also appear in our paper that addressed
the original purpose of the survey: to develop and test a model of the motivational bases of
gun ownership [22]. However, that study used those data merely to assess the stability of a
two-component theory of gun ownership by replicating it in two samples. The study did not
analyze the effects of the Orlando shooting on non owners nor did it report and analyze data
on spending intentions. Thus, the two articles address different questions and review differ-
ent literatures.
The history of this project also explains some of the limitations of this research in
addressing the impact of the Orlando mass shooting on fear of crime and gun spending
intentions. Given that the project was conducted to develop and test a psychological model
of the motivational bases of gun ownership, we focused only on men because they still
represent the majority of gun owners [31]. Furthermore, given that we wanted to use the
post-Orlando sample to assess the stability of our models after such a horrendous tragedy,
we opted for a new sample rather than attempting to re-contact the original, pre-Orlando
survey respondents. However, we made sure that both samples are generally comparable
with regard to relevant demographic criteria. Regrettably, we did not stratify our sample by
race.
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Method
Ethical approval
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology (ECP) of the Faculty of Social
Sciences of the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. Participants were given the follow-
ing consent statement: “This university-based psychological study will ask about your beliefs,
attitudes, and experiences regarding gun ownership and the use of firearms. Your participation is
completely anonymous. No identifying information will be collected from you. Only members of
the research team will have access to the survey data, but even they cannot link the data to any
single person. You can decide whether or not to participate in the study. You can leave the study
at any time.”
Participants
One thousand seven hundred thirty men, in the United States, were recruited via the market
research firm Qualtrics Panels, to complete the study online between May 31 and June 22,
2016. No data were collected on June 12 –the day of the mass shooting. Of these participants,
n = 787 completed the study before the mass shooting and n = 943 completed the study after.
An additional n = 37 were excluded to do quality problems, n = 108 declined to answer the
gun spending intention item, and two gave unlikely values on the gun spending intention item
(> 8 SD beyond the mean).
Participants were recruited primarily by gun ownership (n = 847 gun owners, n = 883
non-owners), with maximum quotas for region of country, age, education, and income.
Regions included: Midwest (n = 402), West (n = 330), Northeast (n = 326) and South
(n = 672). Median age category was “35–44,” education was “Some college,” and income was
$35,000-$50,000 per year. The distribution of education did not differ between gun owners
and non-owners (F< 1), but gun owners tended to report slightly higher age and income cat-
egories (Fage = 10.86, p = .001, η2p = .006; Fincome = 37.29, p< .001, η2p = .021). Among the
gun owners, 79.8% (n = 676) owned a handgun and 75.8% (n = 642) owned a long gun. The
mean number of guns owned was 3.71 (SD = 4.06; range: 1–30), which reflects a pre-post
Orlando difference in self-reported gun ownership. Twenty-one declined to report number
of guns owned, but this did not reliably differ by pre-post Orlando (t< 1). To assess whether
there were significant differences between our pre- and post-Orlando samples of gun owners
and non-owners, we conducted pre-post Orlando comparisons. Gun owners and non-own-
ers did not differ significantly in age, income or education (Fs< 1). However, for gun own-
ers, there was a marginally lower likelihood of being from the South for members of the post-
Orlando sample (Wald = 2.86, p> .09); note, however, that the result is only marginal and
we placed quotas on the number of Southerners to recruit. Non-owners in the post Orlando
sample were also slightly older (F = 6.37, p = .012, η2p = .007). Ultimately, these relatively
minor differences in region and age had no bearing on any of the results reported below
when included as covariates.
Procedure
Participants first self-reported their demographics, above, to screen them for gender (males
only), gun ownership (“Do you own a gun?”), and to ensure a wide range of demographics
(based on region, age, education, and income). To minimize biased language or terminology,
the questionnaires were designed with feedback from two professionals in gun sales and
manufacturing.
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Participants then reported their threat-related beliefs and gun ownership, in counterbal-
anced order. In the post-Orlando sample, knowledge of the mass shooting was an inclusion
criterion.
Perceived lifetime risk of assault. Participants were asked, “What do you estimate is the like-
lihood the following will happen in your lifetime (in your future)?” There were three items: “You
will be mugged”; “You will be violently attacked, and “Your home will be invaded by an armed
burglar” (rated 1 = Not likely at all, to 7 = Very likely, α = .89). The post-Orlando version of
the study included a fourth item, “You will be present during a mass shooting” (M = 2.61,
SD = 1.58).
Belief in a dangerous world. To assess participants’ belief in a dangerous world (BDW), we
used the 10-item version of Altemeyer’s [23] BDW scale developed by Duckitt [24]. Partici-
pants indicated their agreement with statements such as “There are many dangerous people in
our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all” or “Any day now,
chaos and lawlessness could erupt around us. All signs are pointing to it.” (rated 1 = Strongly dis-
agree to 7 = Strongly agree, α = .84). The gun industry professionals advising us on the study
recommended we avoid use of the term “anarchy,” in item 2 of the BDW scale, so we replaced
it with “lawlessness”. Note that the BDW was included in the analysis because Stroebe et al.
[22] demonstrated that, in addition to the specific threat of being violently attacked, gun own-
ership is also motivated by the generalized threat emanating from the belief that the world is a
dangerous and unpredictable place.
Main reasons for owning a gun. Gun owners reported the extent to which each of the fol-
lowing was a reason they owned a gun: Protection/Self-defense, Hunting, Target/Sport Shooting,
Constitutional right / 2nd Amendment, Collecting guns / Hobby, and Other (rated 1 = Not impor-
tant / Not applicable to 7 = Very important). The questions were reframed for non-owners to
be about the main reasons they might consider buying a gun.
Belief gun possession could have prevented the mass shooting. In the post-Orlando ver-
sion of the study, participants read, “The mass shooting in Orlando might have been prevented
if. . .” and below were several different possibilities (rated -3 = Very doubtful/Not applicable to
+3 = Very possible). The prevention belief of interest was “. . .people at the nightclub were
armed.” The other items were “stricter gun control laws were in place”, “better mental health
care existed”, “society was more accepting of gays”, “there was more surveillance of suspected
radicals,” and “society was more cautious of Muslims.”
Unrelated task. Participants then completed a cognitive task lasting about five minutes,
wherein we manipulated its difficulty and subsequently measured state anxious, hostile, and
quiescent affect. This manipulation had the expected main effects on the affect measures
(Fs 49.75, ps< .001), but no main effects on any the variables tested here (Fs< 3.2, ps
.077).
Perceived effectiveness of firearms. All participants were asked, “How effective is gun posses-
sion as a means of. . .” and were first presented with our motivation of interest, “Protection and
Self-Defense” (rated 1 = Not effective at all to 7 = Extremely effective).
Attitudes towards guns. Participants then rated their attitude towards each of four catego-
ries of firearms: Handguns, Precision Rifles, Modern sporting Rifles, and Shotguns (rated
-3 = Extremely negative to +3 = Extremely positive, α = .91).
Sociopolitical beliefs. Among a series of other questions about their beliefs and experiences
with gun ownership and use, participants were asked “In general, do you believe the laws cover-
ing the sale of firearms should be made more strict, less strict, or kept as they are now?” (rated
1 = Much less strict to 7 = Much more strict). They also rated their agreement with “In general,
if more people had guns, there would be less crime” and “In general, the government wants to take
people’s guns away” (rated 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). “
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Experience with victimization. Participants completed a series of questions related to their
personal experience with guns and crime, including whether they knew a specific instance in
which someone close to them was the victim of violent crime (coded 1 if they selected “family
member”, “close friend”, “neighbor”, “someone else close [text-entry option]”, or coded 0 for
“No” or “Not sure”). Each participant also answered whether he had ever been a victim of a vio-
lent crime himself (coded 1 for Yes, 0 for No).
Investment intentions. All participants were asked how much money they intended to
invest in gun-related products (including purchase of a gun) during the next 6 months. These
values were log-transformed to adjust for positive skew.
Results
Table 1 presents the mean responses of gun owners and non-owners surveyed immediately
before and after the Orlando mass shooting. The table also reports the results of significance
tests for differences between pre-Orlando and post-Orlando responses. We conducted separate
one-way ANOVAs within the gun owner and non-owner groups on each of the relevant mea-
sures. The Orlando mass shooting had only a minor impact on non-owners’ perceptions of
threat: Although non-owners believed the world to be marginally more dangerous after
Orlando (BDW, Mpost-Orlando = 4.29 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 4.14, F(1, 881) = 3.66, p = .056, η2p =
.004), the mass shooting did not increase their perceived lifetime risk of being violently
attacked (PLRA, Mpost-Orlando = 3.29 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 3.18, F(1, 881) = 1.04, p = .308, η2p =
.001). Furthermore, the marginal increase in BDW did not correspond with any increased
need to own a gun for self-defense, Mpost-Orlando = 5.25 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 5.23, F(1, 881) = 0.02,
p = .894, η2p = .000. In fact, post-Orlando, non-owners perceived guns as less effective means
for self-defense Mpost-Orlando = 5.03 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 5.40, F(1, 881) = 9.28, p = .002, η2p = .010;
accordingly, their attitude towards guns, which was already not very positive, showed a nega-
tive shift post-Orlando Mpost-Orlando = -0.06 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 0.48, F(1, 881) = 22.22, p< .001,
η2p = .025. After Orlando, non-owners were in favor of greater restrictions on gun sales,
Mpost-Orlando = 5.43 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 4.93, F(1, 881) = 22.22, p< .001, η2p = .025 but,
Table 1. Means by gun ownership and Orlando. Asterisks represent a significant pre-post-Orlando difference (within gun ownership group). ** p < .01, *
p < .05, † p < .06.
Variable Non-owners M (S.E.) Pre-
Orlando
Post-Orlando Gun owners M (S.E.) Pre-
Orlando
Post-Orlando
Ever considered owning a gun 4.33 (.11) 3.90 (.10)** - -
Belief in Dangerous World (10-item) 4.14 (.05) 4.29 (.06)† 4.43 (.06) 4.33 (.05)
PLRA (3-item) 3.18 (.07) 3.29 (.07) 3.78 (.08) 3.53 (.07)*
Reason: Self-defense 5.23 (.10) 5.25 (.09) 5.94 (.10) 5.92 (.09)
Effectiveness of guns for: protection and self-
defense
5.40 (.09) 5.03 (.08)** 6.13 (.08) 6.08 (.07)
Attitude towards guns (4-item) 0.48 (.08) -.06 (.08)** 1.85 (.06) 1.66 (.06)*
Support for stricter laws on gun sales 4.93 (.08) 5.43 (.07)** 4.66 (.08) 4.60 (.07)
Support for gun-free zones 4.99 (.10) 4.65 (.10)* 4.83 (.11) 4.75(.10)
Belief: more guns would reduce crime 3.91 (.10) 4.03 (.10) 3.84 (.11) 3.85 (.10)
Belief: government wants to take guns away 4.14 (.11) 4.26 (.10) 4.19 (.11) 4.40 (.10)
Political orientation (!liberal) 4.76(.11) 5.09 (.10)* 4.60 (.12) 4.57 (.10)
Gun spending intentions (log$) 1.83 (.13) 1.14 (.12)** 4.76 (.13) 4.41 (.12)*
Intent to spend any money on guns 31.4% (2.1) 20.2% (1.9)
**
82.4% (2.0) 79.9% (1.8)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182408.t001
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unexpectedly, less supportive of gun free zones, Mpost-Orlando = 4.65 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 4.99, F(1,
881) = 5.81, p = .016, η2p = .007). There was no shift in support for a federal gun registry
(F< 1.4, p> .239).
Finally, there is a significant decrease in non-owners’ intentions to spend money on gun-
related products during the next six months, Mpost-Orlando ($log) = 1.14 vs. Mpre-Orlando ($log) =
1.83, F(1, 881) = 15.91, p< .001, η2p = .018. This latter effect becomes even clearer when exam-
ining the percentage of non-owners who intend to spend any money on guns: Whereas 31% of
non-owners reported some level of spending intentions before Orlando, spending intentions
dropped to 20% in the post Orlando sample. Now, part of the results could be due to other dif-
ferences between the two samples: Post-Orlando non-owners also reported lower scores on
whether they had ever considered owning a gun, which could suggest a sample difference,
Mpost-Orlando = 3.90 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 4.33, F(1, 881) = 8.04, p = .005, η2p = .005. Yet if we control
for this item, all the effects reported above remained significant—with the exception of politi-
cal orientation, which was rendered marginally significant, Mpost-Orlando = 5.09 vs. Mpre-Orlando
= 4.76, F(1, 881) = 2.85, p = .092, η2p = .003. To summarize, there appeared to be a negative
effect of the Orlando mass shooting on non-owners’ gun spending intentions.
The Orlando mass shooting seemed to have had little impact on gun owners. There is no
evidence of an increase in their fear of crime; Orlando did not increase BDW or PLRA—that
is, belief in a dangerous world, F(1, 845) = 2.11, p = .147, η2p = .002, or perceived lifetime risk
of assault, Mpost-Orlando = 3.53 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 3.78, F(1, 845) = 5.10, p = .025, η2p = .006. In
fact, it appeared to have decreased their perceived lifetime risk of assault—though this is prob-
ably because we added a fourth item about the specific risk of a mass shooting. Gun owners’
already-low support for stricter gun laws remained unaffected by the Orlando massacre, F(1,
845) = 0.28, p = .597, η2p = .000. They also showed no difference in support for gun free zones,
Mpost-Orlando = 4.75 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 4.83, F(1, 845) = 0.24, p = .624, h2p = .000. The Orlando
mass shooting also failed to change their belief that more guns would lower crime, F(1, 845) =
.001, p = .980, η2p = .000. Notably, post-Orlando, the belief that guns reduce crime correlated
positively with a belief the mass shooting could have been prevented if guests at the nightclub
had been armed (r = .61, p< .001). Finally, the Orlando mass shooting failed to increase their
perceived likelihood that the government would take their guns away, F(1, 845) = 1.84, p =
.176, η2p = .002.
The only surprising effects were that post-Orlando gun owners reported less positive atti-
tudes, Mpost-Orlando = 1.66 vs. Mpre-Orlando = 1.84, F(1, 845) = 5.03, p = .025, η2p = .006, and even
slightly lower intentions to invest money in gun-related products, Mpost-Orlando ($log) = 4.41 vs.
Mpre-Orlando ($log) = 4.76, F(1, 845) = 3.91, p = .048, η2p = .005; however, these too could be partly
due to sampling: post-Orlando gun owners also reported owning fewer guns, F(1, 824) = 6.73,
p = .010, ηp2 = .008, and controlling for number of guns owned rendered non-significant the
pre-post Orlando effect on attitudes, F(1, 823) = 2.94, p = .087, η2p = .004, and spending inten-
tions, F(1, 823) = 2.06, p = .152, η2p = .002 (note that controlling for this variable had no bear-
ing on the other results).
Given that the Orlando mass shooting occurred in a gay nightclub, we also explored the
possibility that it had greater impact on the fear of being in a mass shooting of gay rather than
heterosexual men. Toward the end of the post-Orlando survey, participants had the option to
indicate whether or not they were gay. Approximately 5.4% of those who responded to this
question (i.e., 47 out of 867) reported being gay (of which 20 were gun owners and 27 were
non-owners). A 2 (gun owner vs. non-owner) x 2 (gay vs. not gay) ANOVA on perceived risk
of being in a mass shooting indicated no main effect of being gay, (Mgay = 2.83, SD = 1.67,
Mnot gay = 2.60, SD = 1.58), F(1, 864) = 1.16, p = .281, h2p = .001, and no interaction with gun
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ownership (F< 1). Thus, after Orlando there was no indication that gay men were more likely
than heterosexual men to perceive themselves to be at risk of being in a mass shooting.
Did past experience with crime victimization moderate reactions to Orlando? Victimiza-
tion experiences was assessed by asking respondents whether they had ever been the victim
of a violent crime or known somebody who had been victimized. With regards to partici-
pants’ own past victimization, we conducted 2 (Orlando) x 2 (Past Crime Victimization)
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) separately for the gun owner and non-owner samples on
spending intentions. Among the gun owners, there was neither a main effect of pre-post
Orlando, F(1, 843) = 0.49, p = .482, η2p = .001, nor a two-way interaction of Orlando and past
crime victimization, F(1, 843) = 1.27, p = .260, η2p = .002. There was instead just a marginal
main effect of past crime victimization, Mvictims ($log) = 4.94 vs. Mnon-victims ($log) = 4.30, F(1,
843) = 3.83, p = .051, η2p = .005. The more gun owners had experienced crime victimization
in the past, the more they intended spending on guns, irrespective of the Orlando mass
shooting. Among non-owners, there was the same negative main effect of Orlando on gun
spending intentions reported in an earlier analysis (which was not observed among gun own-
ers), F(1, 879) = 6.00, p = .015, η2p = .007, the same positive main effect of past crime victimi-
zation as observed for gun owners, Mvictims ($log) = 2.03 vs. Mnon-victims ($log) = 1.38, F(1, 879) =
6.06, p = .014, η2p = .007, but no interaction of Orlando and past crime victimization, F(1,
879) = 0.07, p = .786, η2p = .000. Altogether, past crime victimization predicted higher spend-
ing intentions generally, irrespective of the Orlando mass shooting. Nearly identical results
were observed when replacing participants’ own victimization experience with whether or
not they just knew someone who had been a victim of crime (e.g., neighbor, close friend, fam-
ily member). Altogether, past victimization did not moderate the impact of Orlando on par-
ticipants’ gun spending intentions.
Given that the lack of an increase in spending intentions is inconsistent with the idea of a
spike in gun sales after mass shootings, we considered whether at least hobbyists and gun col-
lectors increased their spending intentions out of fear that the government will impose stricter
gun control measures. We regressed spending intentions on gun ownership (1 = gun owner,
-1 = non-owner), pre- vs. post-Orlando (1 = post-Orlando, -1 = pre-Orlando), hobby/collecting
guns as a main reason for gun ownership (standardized), and all interactions. Results indicated
only direct effects of gun ownership, B = 1.29 (95% CI: 1.17; 1.42), t(1713) = 20.37, p< .001,
Orlando, B = -.25 (95% CI: -.37, -.12), t(1713) = -3.91, p< .001, and hobby/collecting guns,
B = .79 (95% CI: .66; .92), t(1713) = 12.08, p< .001; there were no interactions (-1.7< ts< 1.2,
ps> .10). Thus, even though gun collectors have higher spending intentions than non-collec-
tors, Orlando did not increase hobbyists’ spending intentions.
In a final analysis, we explored whether different types of gun ownership predicted a shift
in spending intentions pre-post Orlando. From a fear of crime perspective, handgun owner-
ship may be the best means of self-defense given their compact size and portability into pub-
lic spaces; thus, gun owners who already own a handgun may not perceive as strong a need
to buy another gun than owners of long guns only (e.g., those who own a shotgun or rifle)
[32]. After Orlando, gun owners who were also handgun owners (n = 676) only showed a
marginally reduced intention to spend any money on guns, Mpost-Orlando ($log) = 4.61 vs.
Mpre-Orlando ($log) = 4.98, F(1, 674) = 3.65, p = .057, η2p = .005; owners of long guns only
(n = 171) showed no difference in gun spending intentions, Mpost-Orlando ($log) = 3.69 vs.
Mpre-Orlando ($log) = 3.76, F(1, 169) = 0.03, p = .857, η2p = .000. There was thus no indication
that the Orlando shooting increased gun spending intentions among owners of specific
types of weapons.
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Discussion
Even though the Orlando mass shooting was the deadliest mass shooting in American history,
it failed to have an impact on respondents’ perceptions of their life-time risk of falling victim
to violence, even if they had past experience with victimization. Given that gun owners already
owned multiple guns and were thus unlikely to need another firearm for self-defense, we
had expected that the spike in background checks typically observed after mass shootings
(including Orlando) would be driven by non-owners deciding to buy a gun for the first time.
Although the mass shooting slightly increased non-owners’ belief that the world is a dangerous
place, the increased BDW did not correspond with an increased need to own a gun for self-
defense, probably because the mass shooting decreased their perception of the effectiveness of
gun possession for self-defense. After all, guns are of little use in mass shootings: experts warn
against drawing a gun in an active shooter incident, because the police—or other concealed-
carry gun owners—might mistake a would-be hero for the active shooter and kill him or her
[33]. Non-owners also adopted more negative attitudes towards guns after Orlando. Ulti-
mately, there was no evidence that the mass shooting motivated them to purchase a firearm.
In fact, after Orlando, fewer non-owners reported even considering spending money on pur-
chasing a gun.
There was also no evidence that the Orlando shooting motivated gun owners to increase
their gun-related spending above and beyond spending they might have already planned
before the shooting. This was even true for hobbyist gun owners and owners of long guns only
(i.e., those who did not yet have a handgun). Given that the Orlando mass shooting did not
increase gun owners’ threat perceptions, or their need to own a gun for protection and self-
defense, the finding that the mass shooting did not increase their spending intentions is consis-
tent with our theory that perceived threats precede defensive gun ownership [22]. More
importantly, however, these findings are inconsistent with a fear of crime interpretation of
increased gun sales after a mass shooting. Given that we also failed to find an impact of the
Orlando mass shooting in respondents’ support for stricter gun control, there is no support
for the assumption that the spike in background checks following the Orlando shooting was
motivated by gun owners’ fear that the government would introduce stricter gun control
legislation.
So how can we account for the inconsistency of our findings with reports of increased
requests for background checks after the Orlando mass shooting? One possibility is that our
results are not an effect of the Orlando shooting, but an artifact that reflects preexisting differ-
ences between the pre- and post-Orlando samples. The post-Orlando gun owners reported
having fewer guns than the owners in the pre-Orlando sample. If people have fewer guns, they
are likely to have lower spending intentions on gun-related products. However, even though
controlling for this difference affected reported spending intentions, it only eliminated the
apparent reduction in spending intentions. There was still no evidence of any increase in
spending intentions.
There were also differences between the pre- and post-Orlando samples of non-owners.
Non-owners in the post-Orlando sample rated their political orientation as somewhat more
liberal (M = 5.08, SE = 0.09) than did the pre-Orlando sample (M = 4.71, SE = 0.11). Consistent
with this, they reported also to have been less likely to have ever considered buying a gun.
However, controlling for these pre-post Orlando differences did not extinguish the negative
effect of Orlando on non-owners’ spending intentions.
Another possibility to reconcile our findings with the increase in requests for background
checks following a mass shooting, is that these background checks were requested for approval
of a concealed carry permit rather than the purchase of a gun. There are now 12.8 million
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concealed carry permits in the U.S.A. and in 2014 alone, 1.7 million new permits were issued
[34]. It is possible that gun owners (against the advice of experts) believe a concealed weapon
would offer them protection in a mass shooting. News of a mass shooting might, therefore,
have motivated gun owners to apply for a concealed weapon permit. This could certainly
account for part of the increase in requests for background checks. Yet it seems doubtful that
the total increase in these requests was due to gun owners applying for concealed weapon per-
mits; even if it were, it would imply that mass shootings do not increase gun-purchasing
intentions.
We think that the most plausible explanation of our findings is that they represent the
response of a vast majority of Americans to the Orlando mass shooting, and that the people
responsible for the increase in background checks are of an atypical minority, too small to
have a significant impact on our findings. According to press reports, which are based on a
comparison of the number background checks requested in June 2016 (i.e. immediately after
the Orlando mass shooting) with those in the same month of the previous year, there was an
increase of 600,000 requests [2]. However, this increase might not be fully attributable to the
Orlando shooting, because the anticipation of a Clinton presidency may have also helped to
facilitate a general increase in background checks in 2016 (27,538,657), as compared to 2015
(23,141,970) [35]. Thus, even without Orlando there would have been more requests for back-
ground checks in June 2016 than in June 2015. But even if one assumes that 600,000 Ameri-
cans decided to buy guns following the Orlando shooting, it is unlikely that sampling from
approximately 245 million adult Americans, we would have captured a sufficient proportion
of those 600,000 individuals to find a significant difference in gun spending intentions. This
suggests that for most Americans, this tragic event had no impact either on their fear of crime
or their fear of stricter gun control measures. This would be rational, because, as mentioned
earlier, the chance of falling victim to a mass shooting is minimal. Similarly, as past experience
has shown, there is virtually no chance that mass shootings would persuade a Republican-con-
trolled Congress to introduce stricter gun control measures (even though matters might be dif-
ferent at a state level).
Given that we did not anticipate that there would be a mass shooting just as we had finished
collecting data for a study on the motivational bases of gun ownership [22], our study was not
optimally designed for the questions addressed in this article. As a result, our conclusions rest
on less than firm empirical grounds. To generalize our findings to the US population would
have required a representative sample and a repeated measures design. However, with our
large pre-Orlando sample from all parts of the USA and stratified in terms of level of education
and age as well as the extent of matching between the pre-post-Orlando samples, the effects of
the Orlando mass shooting on fear of crime and gun control beliefs would have had to be
extremely weak and/or very limited to not have registered in our survey. Furthermore, given
that the chance is small that there will be another mass shooting just after a representative sur-
vey of gun ownership motives has been conducted, our data will probably be the most valid
indication of the (non-)impact of a mass shooting on fear of crime or fear of restrictive gun
control measures that will be available for the near future.
To optimally assess the motives of individuals who purchase guns following a mass shoot-
ing, one would need population studies just before and just after a mass shooting. Methodolog-
ically less stringent—but easier to achieve—would be interviews with people purchasing guns
in the aftermath of a mass shooting. These respondents could be asked whether they had
decided on their purchase because of the mass shooting and whether it was fear of crime
and/or fear of stricter gun control measures that influenced their decision.
Despite some shortcomings in design, the findings of our study suggest that the widely
held assumption that Americans respond to mass shootings with greater fear of both crime of
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stricter gun controls remains as unsupported as the assumption that large numbers of Ameri-
cans buy guns following a mass shooting. There is no evidence of such a response in the large
sample of Americans who answered our survey. It appears that the individuals who buy guns
following a shooting are some kind of minority who are not representative of the American
people. These unexpected findings should go a long way to reducing the bafflement expressed
by people who wonder how mass shootings could motivate people to buy more guns. As Hud-
son [36] wrote in The Atlantic after the Aurora mass shooting, “The Rest of the First World Is
Astounded by America's Enduring Gun Culture.” From their perspective, there is no better dem-
onstration of the negative effects of the widespread availability of guns than a mass shooting.
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